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Abstract
This paper investigates the simulation of common policy reforms across
different countries. Changes to the equivalence scales of social
assistance systems in favour of pensions and children in Germany,
Ireland and the UK were modelled. Unlike a number of previous studies
of this kind such as Atkinson et al. (1988), reforms were modelled in
the policy and societal context in which the reforms are set. To do this,
three national tax-benefit microsimulation models were used. The
analysis highlighted both the different structure of the policy
instruments used across the countries, but also the importance of the
national environments in which the policy is set. This paper highlights
the difficulties associated with carrying out comparative research of this
nature using national models which were not designed specifically for
this purpose.
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2Introduction
What would be the effect of consistent international changes to national social assistance
schemes? In this paper we outline a microsimulation experiment which models cross-national
change to the position of children and pensioners in means-tested social assistance in
Germany, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. Our research explores some of the limitations and
potentials of cross-national microsimulation. How can consistent changes be assessed across
very different national policy contexts using models based on national data sets and
assumptions?
Microsimulation has developed in national contexts where commentators and analysts share
an appreciation of the policy environment. Microsimulation involves computerised
manipulation of micro-data in order to evaluate changes in incomes due to changes in rules of
taxation and/or social transfers. In each national context such simulation has the primary
audiences of policy makers and academic specialists in the field. Thus the national audience
has, on the whole, an appreciation of the underlying policy context and demographic and
economic structures. A move to cross-national simulation requires therefore both technical
developments of modelling and data analysis and an increase in comparative contextual
sophistication. Interpreting cross-national models requires more than knowledge of the data
and the rules for each country. By the term context, we mean the environment in which
national policies are designed. In other words, each country has a different set of policy
assumptions, different demographic and income profiles and these influence both the inputs
and outputs of microsimulation models. There are two main themes to our paper
1, Methodological. Microsimulation uses survey data to emulate policy implementation and
change. In cross-national comparative work we are therefore faced with a huge range of
increased methodological problems that spring from
a)  the differences in the survey data in each country,
b)  the differences in national policy systems and assumptions, and
c)  the different national policy contexts, such as levels of economic activity,
retirement and child rearing.
2, Evaluative. To assess the potential effects of consistent comparative policy changes in three
countries and to assess their costs and effects on incomes and their distribution. Also to
explain modelled outcomes in relation to the concerns outlined in 1a), b) and c) above.
Readers who are mainly interested in the detail of methodological concerns will find the
majority of detailed discussion in the Appendices. In the main body of the paper our argument
proceeds as follows. In Section 1 we review the problems of comparative microsimulation,
describe the methodology of our microsimulation models for the UK, Ireland and Germany,
and outline their policy context. The majority of detail for each of these three areas is
contained in appendix A.
Section 2 gives the results of the simulations of changes to the treatment of pensioners and
children by social assistance. Section 3 outlines the lessons for future research and the
conclusions from this experimental study.
3Section 1: The Models and their Contexts
Microsimulation modelling is mostly used to evaluate potential policy change. At the national
level it is now increasingly common. The advantages and limitations are now well rehearsed
at the national level. For recent surveys of the literature, see Sutherland (1995) and Merz
(1991). What problems are presented in moving to comparative cross-national
microsimulation modelling?
• Models rely on national data sets with different definitions and samples. Data are rarely
collected deliberately for modelling and hence national models are constrained by, for
instance, differing definitions of income – as annual, monthly or weekly aggregates,
calculated before or after tax, including or excluding benefits in kind, and before or after
housing costs. Each of these potential differences in definition could have significant
effects on results.
 
• National policy environments differ greatly. Microsimulation has been mostly based on
cross-sectional analysis of income related policy change – of taxes and income related
transfers. Social insurance, which relies on working life and contributions, is more difficult
to assess. These differences in policy are not just technical but reflect very different
ideological and political commitments.
 
• Each national system will contain common elements - e.g. income taxation, contributory
and non-contributory benefits, and social assistance, but their rules are very different, and
their claimant populations differ greatly in composition and size. Hence consistent
comparison is difficult.
National microsimulation models are therefore constrained when used in international analysis
by both their data and policy contexts. Can international comparisons overcome the
difficulties of consistency, comparability and cross-national policy context in order to evaluate
potential policy changes?
Previous research provides a guide to some of the approaches, opportunities and pitfalls. We
focus here on microsimulation models that have utilised household data sets.2 Previous
research can be divided into three types.
a)  comparisons using a single country microsimulation model;
 
b)  comparisons using different national models, and
 
c)  integrated modelling.
Type a) compare two national systems using one national model (See table A.1). In other
words different national tax-benefit systems are simulated on a base sample from a single
country. Atkinson, Bourguignon and Chiappori, (1988) was an early example of this type of
analysis. They compared the distributional impact on the French population of replacing the
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the literature.
4French income tax and social assistance system with the UK’s income tax and social
assistance system. More recently, De Lathouwer (1996) simulated elements of the Netherlands
tax/transfer system in a Belgian model comparing aspects of unemployment compensation
schemes in both countries. Models of this type perform an important role in comparing the
impacts of different policy instruments in a single country. A drawback is that policy
instruments are designed with a particular national policy or social context in mind and thus
care must be taken in interpreting results that ignore such differences in context. Secondly,
cross-national investigations cannot be complete because they rely on data from only a single
country and thus ignore differing population, economic and distributional structures.
Type b), summarised in Table A.2, use national microsimulation models and national micro
data sets for comparison. Callan, O’Donoghue, Sutherland and Wilson’s (1997) two-country
study used both Irish and the UK national microsimulation models to carry out a common
Basic Income reform. However, when the authors attempted to extend the analysis to cover
three additional countries, problems of consistency and comparability proved to be
insurmountable (Callan and Sutherland (1997)). Modelling basic income proposals to replace
the entire transfer and personal taxation systems was not possible because of the limitations of
national simulation models. The important lesson is that adapting existing national models is
not always possible to meet a common research agenda: some nationally set parameters were
made without international comparison in mind. For instance, the Belgian model at the time
did not include social insurance contributions. Similarly, the characteristics of national
databases frustrated changing the value of some transfers and hence measuring the impact of
reforms. Lastly, problems of policy context mean that both data and models carry forward the
national socio-economic assumptions, for instance, the definition of a dependent child by age,
residence and financial independence.
Type c), integrated models, have been developed by Bourguignon et al (1997). A three
country integrated model was constructed for France, Italy and the UK. The model
investigated the impact of reforms at a national level using national income distributions. It
also produced a three country “European” income distribution and compared the impact of the
changes at this level.
Our experimental modelling falls into Type b). We use existing national models but instead of
trying to remould the data or models to match the policy design of another country, or impose
a new cross-national regime, we simply alter the existing national assumptions in a common
and consistent way.
The German, Irish and the UK Models’ Common Characteristics
The microsimulation models discussed in this paper cover both tax and social benefit systems.
Models of this kind simulate tax liabilities and benefit entitlements of individuals in a
representative sample of the household population. The data sources are typically household
surveys, but can be based on administrative sources. Nationally representative micro-datasets
are used which contain data on the labour market, income, expenditure and demographic
characteristics. These micro-data produce national estimates of the effects, costs and impacts
on the income distribution. However, nearly all data are limited to household samples and
non-household populations are excluded (Evans 1994). These models are briefly described in
Appendix B.
5Summary of Differences and Similarities in the Models
There are a number of problems of consistency and comparability that arise from the different
types of micro-data used and the models based upon them and are described below.
• Income definitions. All three countries use current income, and this definition fits the
modelling of social assistance - transfers paid to relieve immediate needs for income.
However, Germany uses annual income, whereas the UK and Ireland use mainly current
weekly income. Moving to an average monthly income (one twelfth of annual income) will
still tend to smooth out variations in income apparent in cross-sectional data relating to the
week or month in which the questions were asked. Thus results will tend to comparatively
under-report the number of beneficiaries of social assistance in Germany and over estimate
average annual payments. Also, the imputation of asset values differs between data sets. This
will affect the modelling of means tests for social assistance. Asset reporting in survey data
are often subject to high levels of error and missing values due to the sensitivity of disclosing
capital holdings. German asset data are banded, while asset vales have to be imputed from
investment income streams in the UK and Irish data.
• The data samples. Aside from differences in survey question definitions, the base surveys
for the models are taken from different years and from different parts of the economic cycle.
In addition for the Irish and the UK analyses, the data set is from a different year to the year of
analysis. The Irish model attempts to account for changes to population due to the economic
cycle (such as unemployment levels) through the weighting procedure and accounts for
inflation by income source. The UK model does not change the population weights, but does
account for income inflation. The German model produces results for the year of the sample,
1991
• The models. They have been built for particular purposes and are not necessarily compatible
for cross-national modelling. No attempt has been made to structurally alter the models for the
purpose of cross-national modelling. Our results are therefore determined by the definitions of
outputs produced by the models. There was enough flexibility to use a common analytic
framework throughout, however we were limited in the choice of analysis options. For
example a common equivalence scale was able to be used, but no variation was possible in
this definition. In order to produce results at a household level, some additional programming
of the Irish model was required. Some definitions such as national policy definitions of
children and pensioners were not possible to synchronise and so remain as defined in each
country. These are important elements in the different policy contexts that we discuss further
below. Modelling tax and benefit systems ignores the relative strengths of the non-cash
services and benefits in kind from education, social services and health care systems. The
range of policy instruments modelled varies by country as well. For example, SWITCH does
not model the effects of all methods of coverage of housing costs by social assistance in
Ireland, unlike its German and UK counterparts. Neither Germany nor Ireland simulate local
service charges modelled by POLIMOD. Lastly, SWITCH and POLIMOD allow for reduced
take-up of social assistance benefits, whereas the German model does not. However for the
purposes of this paper, we assume full take-up across all three countries.
6National Policy Contexts
It is important to recognise the different policy environments of the three national systems of
social assistance before modelling changes to them. Microsimulation is of most use to policy
analysts and policy makers if its results can be considered within a wider appreciation of
policy systems. Means-tested minimum income schemes play very different roles in the three
countries. The UK and Ireland are similar as both countries have given a high priority to
means-tested delivery of cash transfers and social assistance has a primary purpose of
maintaining a minimum standard of living. Germany is different. Policy is predicated on
universal coverage by earnings-related social insurance. Such social insurance cover provides
contributory sickness and unemployment benefits and pensions that are designed to maintain
living standards rather than protect against poverty.
The UK and Ireland have largely abandoned earnings related contributory cover for the
working age population.3 The majority of provision for the unemployed is means-tested
assistance, and contributory cover for the sick is mostly flat rate. By contrast, German
provision is mostly from earnings-related social insurance. Unemployment benefits last for a
maximum of 12 months but are then followed by means-tested unemployment assistance of
unlimited duration for those with a contributory record.4 Both forms of benefits are earnings-
related.
Turning to pensions, Germany relies on earnings-related benefits. There is no minimum
pension and hence social assistance provides for those with very low or zero entitlement. The
UK has a minimum contributory retirement pension that will be fairly close to a demogrant in
its coverage when the system is fully mature because of a comprehensive system of credits for
those with gaps in working life. It is not so comprehensive for current pensioners. However,
the basic rates of pension are less than social assistance for pensioners. Additional pensions in
the UK are mainly drawn from the occupational and private sectors. The state earnings related
pension scheme (SERPS) designed to meet the needs of the lower paid and those treated
unfavourably by occupational pensions, only began in late 1970s. The maturation of both state
and private schemes has led to a decreasing proportion of pensioners relying on social
assistance. The Irish social insurance pension system consists of a flat rate payment, with
extra amounts for adult and child dependants, those living alone and aged over 80. It is
payable to those with sufficient contributions. The total amount depends on the number of
contributions paid and is payable at 65 to retirees and all those eligible aged 66 or over.
Coverage is lower than that in the other countries; in 1995, less than 40 per cent of over 65’s
were in receipt of a social insurance pension. A further 26 per cent were in receipt of a means
tested pension. Private pension coverage is also relatively low at 45 per cent.
The previous discussion of contributory coverage shows the potential for social assistance
coverage from the failings of social insurance: mainly those of disablement and lone
parenthood. Such needs may be met through specialised transfers – such as the non-
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(1996a).
7contributory benefits for disablement in the UK (Disability Living Allowance, Attendance
Allowance, and Severe Disablement Allowance) and/or though in-kind services. The position
of lone parents will depend on the coverage of a range of provisions. Social insurance can
cover those with recent experience in the labour market, maintenance from ex-partners can
cover income, and family allowances the needs of their children. The availability of pre-
school child-care and other benefits in kind is also important. The role of social assistance for
lone parents will depend on the extent and coverage of such alternatives. In Germany social
assistance, Sozialhilfe HLU, performs the majority of coverage for uninsured needs due to
disablement – both by providing cash transfers and a range of health and care services. Lone
parents in Germany are catered for as workers through existing social insurance but rely on
assistance as well as State regulated and enforced maintenance provisions. In Ireland
categorical schemes of means-tested benefits for loan parents and disabled persons as well as
the non-categorical means-tested Supplementary Welfare Allowance. In the UK, social
assistance (Income Support) is the main form of support for lone-parenthood.
Table 1
Main Features of Social Assistance in Germany, Ireland and the UK
Benefit Name Benefit group
Germany
Sozialhilfe _ HLU Non categorical scheme
Ireland
Old Age Non-Contributory Pensions Over 66’s
Pre-retirement allowance Unemployed or those out of the labour force
near retirement age
Widow's Non Contributory Pension Widows without children
The Disabled Person Maintenance
Allowance
Long term disabled.
Lone parent's Allowance Lone parents
Carer's Allowance Those caring for elderly or handicapped.
Unemployment Assistance Unemployed without social insurance or those
who have exhausted their entitlement to social
insurance. Also paid to farmers and self-
employed on low incomes. Two Schemes: one
aimed at short term, other at long term
unemployed.
Domiciliary Care Allowance Payable in respect of children with a physical
or mental handicap when cared for in their own
home.
Supplementary Welfare Allowance
(basic payment)
Non categorical scheme. Payable to those
without recourse to other means tested
benefits.
United Kingdom
Income Support Non categorical scheme
Job-seekers Allowance Unemployed
8Table 1 shows the main schemes of social assistance in the three countries, gives their names
and describes their client groups.5 In Germany and the UK, social assistance is based on non-
categorical safety nets, Sozialhilfe HLU and Income Support, respectively. Ireland, on the
other hand, has a number of categorical social assistance schemes; old age non-contributory
pensions for the elderly and the pre retirement allowance for the unemployed or those out of
the labour force near retirement age. The widow's non-contributory pension is aimed at
childless widows, while the lone parent's allowance covers remaining lone parents. Carer's
allowance is paid to those caring for elderly or handicapped. Rent and mortgage supplements
are also payable to those who are not in work and not in local authority housing.6
Social Assistance Populations
The demand for social assistance reflects the coverage of other social transfers and policy
coverage. Assistance has traditionally been a safety net to catch those who fall through. The
numbers claiming assistance are thus defined in part by other elements of the fiscal system.
Table 2 shows the number of claimants and the total number of people who rely on social
assistance (i.e. the total of the claimants, their partners and their children) in each of the three
countries. Germany has the lowest proportion of their total population on assistance – under 4
per cent. The UK has a higher proportion of its population in families receiving assistance,
just under 17 per cent. Ireland however has 21.6 per cent in receipt of benefit. This reflects the
different emphases on social assistance in the three countries. It also reflects the different
economic background in the three countries. Ireland in addition to having a greater emphasis
on social assistance has higher unemployment rates than the other two. Although, the
proportion of people of pension age are lower in the UK and Ireland than Germany, this lower
proportion of pensioners is not reflected in table 2 due to the higher proportions in Germany
receiving adequate insurance pensions.
Table 2
The Relative Sizes of Social Assistance Populations
000s Germany(W)
(1993)
Ireland
(1995)
United Kingdom
(1994)
Claimants 1,117 421.7 5,902
Total Population on
benefits
2,350 776.1 9,892
% of total pop 3.6% 21.6% 16.9%
Sources: DSS Social Security Statistics, Statistics Branch, Northern Ireland Department of
Health and Social Services, Northern Ireland Office, Statistical Information on Social Welfare
Services, DSW, Ireland. Statisches Bundesamt, Wirschaft und Statistik 10/1996 pp633-647
                                          
5 We do not refer to in work social assistance benefits such as Family Credit in the UK or Family
Income Supplement in Ireland, nor various means teasted housing assistance payments as the paper
focuses only on social assistance replacement incomes.
6 There are other payments to cover exceptional needs for rent payments for those in social housing,
but the majority of asistance claimants’ social rent is covered by benefit rates. These exceptional rent
allowance schemes are not modelled.
9Claimant composition
Table 3 outlines the make-up of social assistance claimant populations in Germany, Ireland
and the UK. Before we discuss the different composition of claimants we must warn readers
that there is no consistent definition of claimant types between each system. For instance,
German totals of unemployed are estimated from administrative statistics which showed
claimants who stated that the main reason they were claiming was because of no employment,
while the UK’s and Ireland’s unemployed claimants are defined by strictly enforced
registration at the unemployment benefits office. Another important difference influencing
this comparison is the underlying unit of aggregation used in social assistance schemes,
individual, family or household, and the treatment of young adults as children. The German
system is based on the household and dependent children can be over 16 if they are
unemployed. In the UK the unit is the family and children have to remain in full time
secondary education to remain in the family unit after they reach the age of 16. In Ireland the
unit is the family while children have to be under 15 or else in education.
Table 3
Claimants of Social Assistance (Percentage of Claimants)
% Germany
(1992)
Ireland
(1995)
United Kingdom
(1994)
Pensioners 11 25 31
Lone Parents 16 10 18
Disabled 4 10 11
Unemployed 34 45 32
Others 35 10 7
How are the two claimant groups that most interest us –pensioners and families with children
– represented? Pensioners are more likely to be reliant on social assistance in Ireland and the
UK than in Germany. Children are not identifiable consistently in their own right, but will
most commonly be in working age households defined as unemployed, lone parents or
sick/disabled. The largest group of claimants of social assistance in each country is the
unemployed. The differing proportions of lone parent claimants partially reflect the
differences in concentration of this group in each of the countries and in the case of Germany
partially the reliance of lone parents on other sources of income. The difference in disability
claimant proportions may reflect greater insurance provision in Germany and on the greater
likelihood of older long-term unemployed to claim disability benefits in Ireland and the UK
rather than unemployment benefits.
Expenditure on Social Assistance
Our microsimulation modelling of changes to assistance includes projections about changes in
government expenditure. Where systems are extensive, for instance in Ireland and the UK,
then a small change in benefits may have a significant effect on spending. In Germany, the
opposite holds: any modelling of changes may have a relatively small aggregate effect on
spending. Table 4 shows the expenditure of the three countries on social assistance in cash
terms and as proportions of all social transfers and as proportions of GDP. Again, we warn
readers that these figures are not entirely consistent because each system of social assistance
will cover slightly different profiles of needs - for instance the coverage of housing costs
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which in some cases are included (social housing tenants Ireland and mortgage payers in the
UK).
Table 4 shows those social assistance forms almost 40 per cent of all Irish social security and
almost one third of the UK’s. In Germany it is around 12 per cent. Concentrating on cash
social assistance safety nets to maintain minimum incomes, then these schemes represent over
5 per cent of Irish, 2.6 per cent of UK and only 0.8 per cent of German GDP.
Table 4
Spending on Social Assistance 1990/91
Germany Ireland United
Kingdom
All Social Assistance
% of Social Security 11.8% 39.9% 30.9%
Cash Social Assistance
% of GDP 0.8% 5.1% 2.6%
Source: Eardley et al (1996), Table 2.3
These brief descriptions of social assistance point to important caveats that must inform the
microsimulation modelling that we report in the next section. First, is the huge difference in
context in which social assistance works. Tax-benefit modelling is best suited to national
policy systems where income related transfers and income taxation play a large role. Systems
that heavily rely on benefits in kind and on contributory benefits are more limited. The less
that incomes change due to changes in fiscal policy the less such changes can be modelled and
their costs estimated.
Second, when analysing social transfers the difference in extent of social assistance can lead
to a problem of scale. Comparing social assistance between countries where it operates as a
safety net for a minority that fall through other forms of provision to countries where it is a
main form of income maintenance, means that the relative costs of changes to assistance rates
will differ greatly.
Third, is the problem of claimant composition. This is both the outcome of different profiles
of demand (whether pensioners, lone parents, unemployed etc. have different risks of reliance
on assistance) and the different definitions used to categorise and identify the claimant profile
by each system.
Part 2: Models and Results
Our Assumptions
In this section we outline the assumptions of the simulations and discuss the results of two
main themes of cross-national microsimulation: improvements in the relative assistance rates
of children and pensioners. We describe the relevant detail of social assistance in the three
countries in Appendix C. We have already pointed out that the definition of “children” and
“pensioners” is different in each scheme, and our intention is not to analyse a convergent set
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of consistent definitions, but to examine the effects of similar policies on the different
populations and their national definitions.
We start from a point where a 100 per cent of claimants take-up their entitlement. Because
each system has very different levels of recorded take up and because each national model is
based on different types of data, there is no robust way of setting consistent levels of take-up
across the three models. We therefore use a modelled 100 per cent take up and suggest
changes in this assumption be pursued in future research.
Our results are the changes to disposable household incomes. The household level is chosen
because it is the only consistent level for calculating incomes across all three countries, and to
overcome the different principles used by national systems to aggregate individuals together
for benefits. The income measure we use is a net disposable income, after taxes and transfers,
but before housing costs. We take account of household size by using the OECD equivalence
scale7. With this measure of income we are able to consistently rank incomes, and we do so
into decile groups for our base-line results which then form the basis of distributional analysis
of the subsequent modelling.
We now turn to the simulations themselves. We took two potential changes in assistance
policy
• A change in the relative treatment of pensioner claimants of social assistance compared to
their non-pensioner counterparts
 
• A change in the relative treatment of children in families claiming social assistance to their
adult counterparts.
Both of these groups are potential priorities for concerns with living standards that are not
compromised by other concerns about economic activity. Both pensioners and children are not
expected by society to work and hence the work disincentive effects of such changes do not
make such retargeting politically contentious in their own right. Of course, children do not
live on their own, and hence their needs are part of the family benefit calculation and will
effect their parents’ incomes and incentives.
We model an increase of 10 per cent in rates toward our “target” claimants. Our modelling
does not take into account any change in taxation to fund changes because we base our results
on an assumption of revenue neutrality. Our results are thus those which would occur at no-
cost if pensioners and children were offered 10 per cent increases but other claimants on
assistance had their benefit rates lowered to meet this increased spending.
However, one practical disadvantage of this modelling exercise is in the treatment of children
independently to their families. Children’s benefit rates are less than adults and the overall
effect on family incomes of a 10 per cent rise for children funded by decreases in benefits for
non children is most likely to decrease overall family income (except in some large families).
Thus, the potential practical effect of these simulations is to attempt to refocus assessment
within the family towards children. How this would be done while at the same time reducing
                                          
7 This has a value of 1 for the first adult, 0.7 for each subsequent adult, and 0.5 for each child (defined
as aged under 14).
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family income is difficult to argue in practice. However, while our model design may seem
illogical we are aware that recent changes to the treatment of Income Support children of Lone
Parents in the UK would face precisely this dilemma.
All of our simulations are kept as simple as possible: we try to avoid second-order effects on
taxation. These simulations are thus not based on any real attempt to better the position of
assistance claimants as a whole but is more focused on re-prioritising their needs and costs.
Case 1: Pensioners
Treatment of Pensioners by Social Assistance
We have already mentioned that each policy system and each social assistance scheme defines
claimants differently. This is true of pensioners. In Germany, Sozialhilfe HLU rates for
pensioners are set for all aged 65 and over. In Ireland non-contributory pensions (means tested
social assistance pensions) begin at age 66.8 In the UK, higher rates for pensioners for Income
Support start at the age of 60 and then rise again for those aged 75 and above and again for
those aged 80 and above. The differences between national social assistance schemes are not
limited to these definitions of age-based rates. Ireland and Germany also operate individual
discretion to increase assistance to meet special or particular needs, whereas the UK has tried
to incorporate such additional needs into its categorisation of elderly claimants into more
generous treatment as age (determined by age-bands) increases.
Table 5
Ireland- Age related Means tested payments in 1994
(as a % of payment to single unemployed person aged 35)
Benefit Assumed
Equivalence Scale
Single Under 66 Over 66
Short Term Unemployment Assistance 100
Long Term Unemployment Assistance, Supplementary Welfare
Allowance, Disabled Persons Maintenance Allowance, Single
Woman’s Allowance, Unmarried Mother’s Allowance,
Deserted Wives Allowance (66-), Widow’s Non-Contributory
Pension(66-)
104
Domiciliary Care Allowance 161
Old Age Non Contributory Pension 104
Married
Short Term Unemployment Assistance 162
Long Term Unemployment Assistance, Supplementary Welfare
Allowance, Disabled Persons Maintenance Allowance
166
Old Age Non Contributory Pension 166
Note Social Welfare Recipients over age 80 and individuals over 66 living alone receive extra amounts worth
about 7.5 per cent of the single unemployed rate.
                                          
8 Slightly higher payments are made to those living alone and to those who are aged over 80.
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Germany has the most simple of benefit rates. The basic rate of individual benefit is paid at
120 per cent for someone aged 65 or over. Ireland’s categorical system is far more complex
and Table 5 shows the different rates for Irish assistance pensioners and others. The UK now
has a very rigid definition of categorical help within IS which is given in Table 6.
Table 6
United Kingdom:- Age related Means tested payments in 1997
(as a % of payment to single unemployed person aged 35)
Age Group 18-24 25-59 60-74 75-79 80+
Single
Assumed Equivalence
scale
(79) 100 140 144 154
Married
Assumed Equivalence
scale
119 157 217 223 236
If we compare the three assistance schemes in their relative treatment of pensioners as against
other adult claimants then, from the basic rates of benefit, the UK is most “generous” starting
at 140 per cent of the single adult rate for pensioners aged 60 and above. Pensioner status
starts at an older age and is less generous in Ireland and Germany (although readers must
remember that additional discretionary help is available to supplement this in these countries).
The Relative position of pensioners
However the treatment of pensioners by assistance schemes is not the only matter which will
effect their position in the income distribution during modelling of changes. If the vast
majority of pensioners are rich in one country and the vast majority is poor in another, then
that will significantly effect the results. Table 7a shows the proportion of individual
pensioners (as defined by social assistance scheme) in each ranked household income decile
for each country
Table 7a shows that that each country does not have the same proportion of their population as
pensioners defined by social assistance rules. Germany and the UK have, around one fifth of
their population so defined (21 per cent and 19 per cent respectively) while Ireland has only 9
per cent. This is a result of both underlying differences in age structures and different policy
definitions – eg Ireland has a “younger” population in general and defines it’s pensioners for
social assistance at 66 years old and above.
Table 7b shows that pensioners are disproportionately in the bottom half of the income
distribution in all three countries. While Germany and the UK show a similar spread of
pensioners below the median income line (5th decile), Ireland has far fewer of its pensioners in
its bottom two deciles.
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Table 7a
The Position of Pensioners in National Income Distributions1,2
% of
population
Germany Ireland United Kingdom
Pensioner Non-
Pensioner
Pensioner Non-
Pensioner
Pensioner Non-
Pensioner
All 18.5 81.5 9.1 90.9 20.6 79.4
As a % of each decile group
Germany Ireland United Kingdom
Bottom 15.9 84.1 0.9 99.1 5.0 95.0
2nd 28.2 71.8 3.1 96.9 50.3 49.7
3rd 27.7 72.3 24.4 75.6 44.1 55.9
4th 26.1 73.9 19.8 80.2 26.3 73.7
5th 21.1 78.9 13.2 86.8 20.3 79.7
6th 18.3 81.7 7.9 92.1 17.9 82.1
7th 15.8 84.2 7.6 92.4 13.6 86.4
8th 9.7 90.3 9.8 90.2 12.9 87.1
9th 11.5 88.5 6.1 93.9 12.4 87.6
Top 7.4 92.6 3.8 96.2 13.9 86.1
Notes.
1 These percentages are of grossed up samples from national household survey data and only
include persons living in private households.
2. National definitions of pensioners are used.
3 Income defined as disposable income per adult equivalent.
Table 7b
The Distribution of Pensioners Across the Income Distribution
Germany Ireland United Kingdom
Bottom 9.7 1.4 2.8
2nd 14.9 3.0 18.2
3rd 14.9 21.1 19.3
4the 15.5 19.6 14.1
5the 11.7 15.3 11.2
6the 11.0 10.4 9.8
7the 8.9 8.9 7.1
8the 4.9 10.8 6.3
9th 5.5 6.4 5.5
Top 3.2 3.2 5.6
Total 100 100 100
Note: rows may not sum exactly to 100 due to rounding
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Estimates of 10 per cent increase in Pensioner Assistance
We now turn to the first of our estimations: What would be the effect of increasing the social
assistance rates for pensioners by 10 per cent? We show the results of a 10 per cent increase in
pensioners’ assistance rates funded by a reduction in the assistance to non-pensioners by 10
per cent. Table 8 shows that in Germany and Ireland other claimants would lose 5 to 6 per
cent of their benefits, while in the UK they would decrease by 14 per cent. Why does this
reform increase costs in the UK and reduce costs in the other countries? Firstly the UK
equivalence scale is more favourable to pensioners than other groups relative to the other
countries. and secondly because the definition of “pensioner” in the UK means tested benefits
system starts at age 60, compared to 65 and 66 in Germany and Ireland respectively. The
reform however costs most in Germany due to the low proportion of pensioners receiving
means tested benefits here.
Table 8
Changes to assistance rates for a revenue neutral increase of 10 per cent to pensioners
% change Germany Ireland United Kingdom
Pensioners +10 +10 +10
Non-Pensioners -5 -6 -14
Table 9 shows the resulting distribution of changed expenditure. First, we must point out that
achieving an exact revenue neutrality is difficult because rates of benefit are changed to the
nearest 10th of a percentage. Table 9 shows how changes in expenditure are shared very
differently across the income distribution in each country. Germany’s assistance population is
entirely in the bottom two decile groups, whereas in the UK and Ireland they are spread more
throughout the income distribution. This as a result of the different benefit units used by the
social assistance systems and the relative importance of social assistance across the countries.
For instance in Germany, where social assistance is based on household circumstances, elderly
members of wealthy households will not get social assistance. However in Ireland and the UK
as the means test is based on family circumstances (i.e. on a single person or couple), elderly
individuals living in wealthy households can and do receive social assistance. Furthermore as
pointed out above social assistance is relatively less important in Germany and thus a reform
like this will produce a smaller effect than the other two countries. In all three countries there
is a saving in the bottom decile, which confirms that there are more non-pensioners than
pensioners in the poorest decile as shown in Tables 7a and 7b. This is as expected as social
assistance rates are higher for pensioners as a result of greater needs.9
                                          
9 For example they cannot work to increase their income
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Table 9
Distribution of change in expenditure as a result of revenue neutral pensioner reform (in
million national currency units)
Decile
group
Germany
DM million
Ireland
Ir£ million
United Kingdom
£ million
bottom -33.2 -19.5 -273.0
2 +30.2 -10.1 51.5
3 0 6.8 66.2
4 0 8.8 109.2
5 0 2.0 37.4
6 0 0.5 11.1
7 0 1.9 13.2
8 0 2.9 2.3
9 0 1.0 -6.4
top 0 1.2 -2.1
Total -3 -4.5 7
Table 10
Distribution of Gainers and Losers as a result of revenue neutral pensioner reform
Germany Ireland United Kingdom
Total
Households
affected
1.6 million 0.38 million 4 million
 of all 6.4 36.9 17.3
Distribution of Losing and Gaining Households
 of all 2.3 4.0 14.6 22.3 10.03 7.3
Decile Gain Lose Gain Lose Gain Lose
1 80.8 88.5 2.8 30.9 12.2 42.8
2 19.2 11.5 5.2 23.9 21.9 16.4
3 0 0 25.5 9.2 20.4 12.5
4 0 0 24.9 11.4 21.5 7.9
5 0 0 11.9 8.7 10.2 6.7
6 0 0 8.4 6.6 5.7 4.7
7 0 0 7.1 4.4 3.9 2.4
8 0 0 7.2 2.2 2.8 2.8
9 0 0 4.2 1.8 0.6 2.0
10 0 0 2.9 0.9 0.8 1.8
Total 100 100 100 100 100.0 100.0
Table 10 shows the distribution of losers and gainers and provides a clearer picture of the
overall distribution of results. First, the number of households affected by the changes is
determined in part by the scale of social assistance. In the UK such changes affect about 17
per cent of all households, whereas in Germany only around 6 per cent are affected. In Ireland
by contrast 37 per cent of households are affected by the reform. This difference in scale is
however, accompanied by marked differences in the split between losers and gainers. In
Germany, the minority of claimants are pensioners (see Table 3 above) and hence of the 6 per
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cent of the households affected, 4 per cent lose and 2 per cent gain. In the UK, pensioners
form one third of the assistance population and are treated already more generously, hence
there are more gainers than losers. In Ireland because of the smaller number of elderly, there
are less gainer households than losers, but the gainers gain more than the losers lose.
The most marked difference is in the spread of the effects of the changes. In Germany all
losers and gainers are confined to the bottom two deciles because that is where the assistance
population is in the household income distribution. Whereas in the UK, the effects and pattern
of losers and gainers is mostly spread across the bottom half of the income distribution, with
small effects above this level due to poor pensioners living in non-assistance claiming richer
households. More lose than gain in the bottom decile, because pensioners are more generously
by benefits (see Table 6) and this decile of the UK income distribution is not heavily
populated by pensioners (see Table 7). There is a similar pattern in Ireland for the distribution
of losing households. The gainers however are more concentrated in the middle of the
distribution, with 70 per cent of gainers being concentrated between the third and sixth
deciles.
Case 2: Children
The Treatment of Children by Social Assistance
Children are treated differently in assistance schemes. In Germany, children are defined
according to age rather than status as all individual assistance scales are based on set
proportions of the single adult scale. In the UK, where assistance works on a family unit
model, a child is defined as under 16, or between 16 and 18 and still in full time education.
The corresponding definition in Ireland is under 18 and for certain benefits between 18 and 21
if in full-time education. The calculation of children’s rates also differs. Ireland do not pay
additional amounts for children, but child benefit is paid in addition to assistance. Germany
and the UK have age related scale rates for children, and the UK has a supplementary
premium for families with children in addition. Table 11 gives the implied equivalence scales
used in all three schemes.
Table 11 shows that Germany has the most “generous” underlying relative treatment of
children within its social assistance scheme. It pays 50 per cent of adult rates to those under 7
– compared to 34 per cent for the UK treatment of under 11-year-olds and 25 per cent for long
term payments in Ireland. However, the UK also weights benefits with the addition of
premiums for the existence of children and child benefits in Ireland are not included in the
means test as they are in both other countries. Thus for a couple with a single child under 7 an
additional 56 per cent of single adult rates would be added to assistance in the UK but only 50
per cent in Germany and still only 35 per cent in Ireland. However, if such a family had an
additional child of the same age the additional component would rise to 100 per cent in
Germany, only 90 per cent in the UK and 70 per cent in Ireland. Both German and UK
schemes recognise the additional costs of lone parenthood by additions to basic rates of
benefit. Readers should note that the UK will cease these additional elements for lone parents
from April 1998.
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Table 11
Child Rates for Assistance and their equivalence to single person rate
% single person rate (aged 35)
 Germany  Ireland  United Kingdom
Child Additions for Social Assistance Payments
Age Benefit Type Age
Under 7 50% Short term 22% Under 11 34%
7 to 15 65% Long-term 25% 11 to15 50%
15 to 18 90% 16 to 17 60%
18 79%
Other Child Related Benefits paid as part of Assistance
Lone Parent 20% Child Benefit 10% Family Premium
Lone Parent
Premium
22%
11%
Tables 12a and 12b show again that each country has different population profiles and that
these profiles are spread differently across the income distribution. Using the different policy
definitions of children, they represent almost one third of the population in Ireland, almost 21
per cent in the UK and just over 18 per cent in Germany. Of these nearly 70 per cent of
German children are located in the bottom half of the income distribution, with about 60 per
cent in Ireland and 63 per cent in the UK. However, significantly nearly a quarter of Irish
children are members of households in the bottom decile compared to 17 per cent in the other
countries.
Table 12a Position of children in the Income Distributions
% of
population
Germany Ireland United Kingdom
Children Adults Children Adults Children Adults
All 18.4 81.6 32.6 67.4 22.3 77.7
As a % of each decile group
Bottom 28.7 71.3 56.5 43.5 43.7 56.3
2nd 22.2 77.8 39.6 60.4 17.7 82.3
3rd 23.8 76.2 28.8 71.2 21.6 78.4
4th 25 75 26.8 73.2 27.7 72.3
5th 19.7 80.3 31.9 68.1 27.4 72.6
6th 19 81 36.3 63.7 22.9 77.1
7th 13.3 86.7 28.4 71.6 18.3 81.7
8th 11.6 88.4 26.3 73.7 14.0 86.0
9th 9.6 90.4 22.9 77.1 11.9 88.1
Top 6 94 13.5 86.5 8.9 91.1
Notes:
1 These percentages are of grossed up sample and therefore only include persons living in private households.
2. National definitions of children are used.
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Table 12b Distribution of Children across Income Distribution
Germany Ireland UK
Bottom 17.2 24.3 22.6
2nd 12.0 10.7 5.9
3rd 12.9 6.9 8.8
4th 14.9 7.4 13.7
5th 11.0 (total 1-5 68%) 10.3 (total 1-5 60%) 14.0(total 1-5 65%)
6th 11.5 13.3 11.6
7th 7.5 9.2 8.9
8th 5.9 8.0 6.4
9th 4.6 6.7 4.8
Top 2.6 3.2 3.3
Total 100 100 100
Notes: columns may not add up to 100 due to rounding
Estimates of 10 per cent increase in Children’s Social Assistance
Table 13 shows the changes required in adult benefit rates to increase benefit rates of children
by 10 per cent in each of the countries. These proportions are all much smaller than for the
pensioner simulation because the rates of benefits for children are lower and because of their
number in relation to pensioner claimants. In Germany, benefit rates for non-children would
fall by 2.3 per cent, In Ireland by 1 per cent and in the UK by 2 per cent to fund a 10 per cent
increase for children. Therefore because of the relative size of the adult and child social
assistance populations, the increase in children’s assistance rates can be financed by a small
decrease spread across the greater adult population.
Table 13
Changes to child means tested benefit rates and adult rates to achieve revenue neutrality
Germany Ireland United Kingdom
Children +10 +10 +10
Adults -2.3 -1 -2
Table 14 highlights the distributional impact of such a reform. Like the pensioner simulation,
we notice the that changes are targeted in Germany in the lower deciles and in Ireland and the
UK the impact is spread throughout the distribution. Noticeably in each country, the bottom
decile are net gainers from this reform as a result of the concentration of children in this decile
highlighted in tables 12a and 12b. All other deciles are net losers however, highlighting how
effective targeting expenditure on children in families on social assistance is in achieving
vertical redistribution.
Table 14 shows the distribution of changes in spending as a result of these changes to benefit
rates
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Table 14
Distribution of change in expenditure as a result of revenue neutral child reform (in
million national currency units)
Decile Germany Ireland United Kingdom
1 33.4 10.8 68.8
2 -27.9 -0.6 -5.1
3 0 -1.8 -20.8
4 0 -2.4 -30.6
5 0 -1.1 -14.8
6 0 -0.8 -9.4
7 0 -0.7 -4.9
8 0 -0.5 -2.5
9 0 -0.3 -0.2
10 0 -0.2 -2.3
Total 5.6 2.4 -21.9
Table 15 shows the distribution of gainers and losers. As nearly social assistance households
are affected by these changes as in the case of the pensioner reform, the totals are very similar.
However because very many households have their incomes slightly reduced, there are very
more losers than in the pension reform. The concentration of gainers is also apparent, with all
gaining households in Germany two thirds in Ireland and just over half in the UK in the
bottom decile. In each country over 80 per cent of gainers are in the bottom three deciles. As
in the pensioner analysis, the distribution of losers is spread out over the income distribution,
especially in the bottom five deciles.
Table 15
Distribution of Gainers and Losers of revenue neutral 10 per cent increase in child rates
Germany Ireland United Kingdom
Total Households
affected
1.5million 0.38 million 4.4 million
 Of all 6.0 36.4 19
Distribution of Losing and Gaining Households
Gain Lose Gain Lose Gain Lose
 Of all 1.8 4.2 10.4 26.0 5.5 13.5
Decile
1 100 78.2 64.5 2.2 16.5 51.3
2 0 22.8 13.3 18.0 20.3 26.8
3 0 0 6.6 19.5 18.4 14.4
4 0 0 6.2 20.7 18.1 2.0
5 0 0 3.3 12.2 10.3 3.0
6 0 0 3.9 8.6 6.2 0.6
7 0 0 1.4 7.0 4.1 1.2
8 0 0 0.6 5.7 3.1 0.3
9 0 0 0.2 3.6 1.6 0.3
10 0 0 0.0 2.4 1.4 0.0
Total 100 100 100 100 100.0 100.0
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Part 3: Conclusions
Our results show the effects on changing the priorities for means-tested social assistance for
pensioners and for children. However, our analysis emphasises that these outcomes are not
merely the result of technical changes to rules, but are also the outcomes of the size of
claimant populations, their composition, and their relationship to the wider population
structures and income distribution.
Our experiment has analysed the simulated effects of consistent changes to existing policies in
each of the three countries rather than the effects of imposing a cross-national radical change
or other larger policy innovation. We do not make any claims that such set percentage changes
in benefits are more realistic international propositions, but that they offer an alternative way
of approaching cross-national microsimulation. Other research in this mould could seek to
obtain “outcome” measures, such as a reduced level of child poverty or pensioner poverty
rather than experiment with the benefit rates. We have also not attempted to alter the tax
system to pay for any of our changes.
Our approach has, however, linked the modelling and methodological concerns directly to
those of the three national policy environments. We consider this important and essential. If
microsimulation is to advance in a comparative perspective it must carry policy description
with it. The alternative approach is tempting, to turn the reality of populations structures and
policy paradigms into exogenous context, but we believe it could be misleading. Without
context, the results would be largely meaningless, because the differences in remodelling
social assistance in Germany, Ireland and the UK tell us more about the underlying
assumptions about social security and social assistance than they do about the hypothetical
changes themselves.
The substantial differences between Germany and the other two countries says much more
about the role there of social assistance as a last line of safety net income when compared to
Ireland and the UK’s mass use of means-tested social assistance.
Our suggestion that context is crucial to cross-national microsimulation does not alter the
need for methodological development. Our lessons in this regard are several, primarily
relating to the lack of flexibility when using national microsimulation models. Although we
have been able to carry out a cross-country analysis, we would not have been able to expand
the analysis to using different equivalence scales, income measures or unit of analysis. We
were also limited to national definitions such as the definitions for children and pensioners.
These limitations would also almost certainly limit our ability to expand the cross-country
comparison to more countries as has been found in other studies of this type.10
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APPENDIX A
Previous International Microsimulation: approaches and problems
In this appendix, we describe some of the previous comparative studies carried out using
microsimulation. We divide these studies into three groups. The first group consists of papers
which used one national model to compare different national tax-transfer systems. The second
group, which this paper falls into is where different national models are used to compare
different policy environments. Therefore policies are compared in their own policy
environment. These studies are summarised in table A.1. The final group also summarised in
table A.2. consist of models specifically designed to carry out comparative analyses.
There have been two collections of studies of the first type. These include work done by
Atkinson, Bourguignon & Chiappori, (1989) who looked at aspects of the UK system using a
French dataset and model. In this way they were able to compare the UK and French tax and
benefit systems. A similar study was carried out by De Lathouwer (1996) who compared the
Belgian and Netherlands’ unemployment compensation schemes. A disadvantage of papers
such as these is that they compare policies without accounting for the social and economic
environments they are designed for. Thus features which are designed for a particular purpose
in one country may not necessarily be apparent in another country. In addition studies such as
these have tended to focus solely on certain aspects of tax-transfer systems. In doing this they
keep other instruments constant. For example when comparing Dutch and Belgian
unemployment systems in a Belgian model, only unemployment benefits were modelled. So
for example assumptions had to be made about the impact of taxation in the Netherlands.
Differences between child payments were also ignored. Other assumptions may need to be
made if for example the data are not available to model another country’s instrument. This
applied in the Bourguignon et al. (1997) analysis where hours of work was unavailable in the
French dataset which was needed to simulate UK In-work benefits.
Table A.1
Description of other Cross-country Analyses which use multi country tax/transfer system modules and datasets
Paper: Callan, O’Donoghue, Wilson &
Sutherland, 1995
Callan & Sutherland, 1997 Bourguignon, O’Donoghue, Sastre-
Descals, Spadaro & Utili, 1997
Description 2 cross-country analysis of BI1
reforms
5 cross-country analysis of BI1
reforms
3 country integrated model
Countries UK, Ireland UK, Ireland, Belgium, France &
Italy
UK, Italy and France
Unit of analysis Family? Household/ Family Household
Main Features Compared impact of reforms using
common definitions in two national
models.
Highlight difficulties in extending
analysis to 5 countries using
national models.
Uses integrated model to produce
cross-national and supra national
analyses.
Definitions Existing National Definitions Existing National Definitions Existing National Definitions
Input Data Problems (i) Model data from different years
and economic cycles.
(ii) All instruments not in data2
(i) Model data from different years
and economic cycles.
(ii) All instruments not in data2
(i) Model data from different years
and economic cycles.
(ii) Different definitions in different
surveys, e.g. “Wage”
Intermediate model process
problems
Interactions with HB
Take up rates vary.
(i) Interactions with HB
(ii) When an MTB is contained
only in the data, then it cannot
change in response to changes in
means
(iii) Take up rates vary.
Take up rates vary
Output Data Problems Limited by rigidity of existing
national models in terms of:
(i) Output table definitions and
(ii) Equivalence scales
Limited by rigidity of existing
national models in terms of:
(i) Output table definitions and
(ii) Equivalence scales
(i) Outputs refer to different
accounting periods
Note 1. BI= Basic Income; SAB Social Assistance Benefits; HB Housing Benefits
2. This is relevant if instruments are not simulated in the national model
APPENDIX B The Models
Germany
The German model is a microsimulation model of the German tax-benefit system in
1991, designed specifically to look at the social assistance in the Western part of
Germany developed by Evans (see Evans, 1998). The data are taken from the 1991
wave of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). (see Burkhauser and Wagner,
1990). Income data are mainly at the individual level, but child benefit, social
assistance and investment income is collected only at the household level. Data exists
for income received in each month of the year, from which annual income is
produced. The model simulates income taxes, employee social security taxes, church
taxes and social assistance benefits. Local taxation, employer social insurance
contributions, child benefit and contributory benefits however are not modelled. Child
benefits (Kindergeld) and social insurance benefits are taken from the GSOEP. Social
assistance is modelled at the household level, while, social security taxes are modelled
at the individual level and income taxes are modelled at the tax unit level.
Ireland
The Irish model, SWITCH, described in (Callan, O’Donoghue and O’Neill, 1996) is
based on the 1987 Survey of Income Distribution, Poverty and Use of State Services
collected by the ESRI. The income used is current income which is usually defined as
income earned in the previous week or month. Incomes that are prone to variation
however such as self-employment income are recorded on an annual basis. SWITCH
simulates personal income taxes and employee social insurance contributions as well
as child benefits, social assistance and social insurance benefits. Local taxes were non
existent and employer social assistance contributions are not modelled. All weekly
social assistance and insurance benefits are modelled except for social assistance to
cover housing costs. As there is no information in the survey on social insurance
contribution records, simulated entitlement is based on recorded entitlement to
contributory benefits in the survey. Simulated taxes on self-employment and farming
are scaled down to account for the lower actual tax-base, while the unit of analysis is
primarily the family unit or the household. The income unit used is weekly income.
Unlike the German model, the year of analysis is not the same as that of the survey
data. Whereas the data are taken from 1987, than analysis is carried out using the 1994
system. In order to do this, the 1994 analysis incorporates a reweighting of the
underlying sample to changes in demography and employment/unemployment etc.
United Kingdom
POLIMOD, the UK model is based on the Family Expenditure Survey (See CSO
1990). The survey collects detailed information at the individual level on both current
weekly incomes and expenditures, as well as other socio-economic labour market and
demographic variables. As there are no data on wealth in the survey, estimates are
imputed from questions on interest and dividends. Some data are also collected at the
household level and at the benefit unit level such as social insurance and means tested
benefits. POLIMOD is the most comprehensive of the three microsimulation models
(see Redmond, Sutherland and Wilson, 1998) for a description). In addition to
modelling income taxes, employee social insurance contributions and social assistance
benefits, it models local taxation, indirect taxation and employers social insurance
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contributions. Social insurance benefits are not specifically simulated in POLIMOD,
relying instead on the recorded information in the FES. The unit of analysis is the
family unit, the household or the individual under certain assumptions and the income
unit used is weekly income. Incomes from self-employment and investment income
are weighted up to match national economic profiles. Like the Irish model, POLIMOD
uses a data set different to the year of analysis. Up-rating procedures are used to make
the data represent the present.
APPENDIX C THE RULES AND OPERATION OF
SOCIAL ASSISTANCE
The rules for claiming assistance are usually complex and require data which is often
not available to the modeller. For instance, some social assistance schemes can meet
individual needs which arise from expensive locations or special circumstances of the
claimant. Germany and Ireland are examples. The UK, however, has no discretion in
its calculation or rates of benefit. The whole system has been rigidly defined into set
rates for differently defined claimants. Ireland and the UK have a national centralised
scheme whereas Germany has federal and constitutional rules which are left to
regional and municipal authorities to implement and interpret. These differing
structures are also manifested in differing attitudes to benefit rates, where in Ireland
and the UK they are set centrally at specified sums, while in Germany are set
regionally and hence differ across the country.
Table B.1 shows the rates for assistance for a hypothetical adult aged 35 and for a
single pensioner in each country. Benefits are calculated on a weekly basis in Ireland
and UK while they are monthly in Germany. Table B.2 shows them in monthly £
sterling purchasing power parity and as a proportion of average earnings.
Table B.1
Single Person and Single Pensioner Assistance Rates - 1992
£ sterling Purchasing Power Parities and per cent of average earnings
Germany Ireland United Kingdom
Single aged 35
£ PPP 141 221 184
% ave earnings 10.7 18.7 15.2
Pensioner aged 68
Nominal 170 281 248
% ave earnings 12.9 23.7 20.5
Source: Eardley et al (1996)
Table 6 shows the breakdown of the German Sozialhilfe HLU rates by region and then
gives the weighted and unweighted average basic rates of benefit. 514 DM per month
is the average rate, and the weighted average, allowing for difference claimant
populations in each Land is 513DM
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Table B.2
Sozialhilfe HLU – regional rates and variation 1993
Western States of Germany only
DM per month
Baden Würtemburg 515
Bayern 497
Berlin-West 519
Bremen 516
Hamburg 517
Hessen 515
Neidersachsen 514
Nordrhein-Westfalen 514
Rheinland-Pfalz 514
Saarland 514
Schelswig-Holstein 519
Average (unweighted) 514
Average (weighted) 513
Source: Statisches Budesamt, Sozialleistungen: Fachserie13, Reihe 2 Sozialhilfe,
Metzler Poeschel, Wiesbaden
